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I.

PROFILING THE RELEASED DETAINEES

1

In 2008, the Center for Policy and Research at Seton Hall University School of Law (the “Center”) undertook to ascertain release
data for detainees at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, and compare that data
to other variables in a search for correlations. This effort required
analysis of numerous governmental sources. As documented in the
Center’s first report, A Profile of 517 Detainees Through Analysis of Department of Defense Data, the majority of detainees at Guantánamo Bay
were never alleged to have committed hostile acts against United
States or coalition forces, and 60% of all detainees were merely “asso2
ciated” with al Qaeda or the Taliban. In order to determine who of
the detainees were released and when they were released, the Center
*

Professor, Seton Hall University School of Law, and Director, Seton Hall University School of Law Center for Policy and Research. The Report benefited from
the research and contributions of Christopher Fox and Lauren Winchester.
**
Partner, Denbeaux & Denbeaux. Counsel to two Guantánamo detainees.
1
This Report, originally published on August 8, 2008, used government data obtained from Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) litigation. More information has
been made available through later government releases and WikiLeaks. This Report
was not updated based on WikiLeaks and later government releases. For future reports by the Seton Hall University School of Law Center for Policy and Research
(the
“Center”),
visit
the
Center’s
website
at http://law.shu.edu/ProgramsCenters/PublicIntGovServ/policyresearch/Guantan
amo-Reports.cfm.
2
See MARK DENBEAUX ET AL., A PROFILE OF 517 DETAINEES THROUGH ANALYSIS OF
DEPARTMENT
OF
DEFENSE
DATA
6
(2008),
available
at
http://law.shu.edu/publications/guantanamoReports/detainees_then_and_now_fin
al.pdf.
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gathered and reviewed data released by the Department of Defense.
This data, which were produced either voluntarily or as the result of
litigation and Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests by the
media and other public interest groups, has enabled the Center to
uncover the connection between the nationality of detainees, the allegations against them, and their release dates. At the time when the
Report was written, enough information had been produced to compile a reliable profile of those detainees who were released from
Guantánamo Bay.
II.

THE DATA SOURCES

The Center started with a review of an Associated Press FOIA request, which obtained a summary of classified evidence (“R1”) regarding the status of detainees at Guantánamo Bay from the detai4
nee’s Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) hearings. The
Center next considered documents released by the government on
April 19, 2006, which showed the Internment Serial Numbers (ISN)
along with the names of the 558 detainees who participated in
5
CSRTs. The Center reviewed documents released by the government on May 15, 2006, which listed the names of all 759 men who
6
had been detained at Guantánamo. This latter list allows an inference that the 201 detainees who never participated in a CSRT were
released or transferred at some point before the CSRT process began.
In addition, the Center reviewed the government-released Ad7
ministrative Review Board (ARB) data. The ARB data determines
whether detainees should continue to be detained, taking into account
the findings of a detainee’s CSRT. This information was then com3

Because the method used to create the release model uses the date of the last
recorded weight of the detainees as a criterion of release before November 2006, the
three detainees who committed suicide in June 2006 are included among those considered released. Because this is a small percentage of those listed as released, the
effect on any findings is minimal.
4
For a list of the FOIA-released summaries of classified evidence see Combatant
Status Review Tribunals (CSRT) and Administrative Review Board (ARB) Documents, U.S.
DEP’T
DEF.,
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/
csrt_arb/index.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2011) [hereinafter CSRT & ARB].
5
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., LIST OF DETAINEES WHO WENT THROUGH COMPLETE CSRT
PROCESS
(2006)
[hereinafter
CSRT
LIST],
available
at
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/detainee_list.pdf.
6
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., LIST OF INDIVIDUALS DETAINED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE AT GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA FROM JANUARY 2002 THROUGH MAY 15, 2006
OF
DETAINED
INDIVIDUALS],
available
at
(2006)
[hereinafter
LIST
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/detaineesFOIArelea
se15May2006.pdf.
7
See CSRT & ARB, supra note 4.
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bined with R1 data—the unclassified summary of the evidence for
each detainee. Then, this data-set was cross-correlated with the dates
and put together with the ISN, nationality, and the “profile” of the
558 detainees who received CSRT hearings. This Report relies on the
government’s contention that the R1 data presents a fair and accurate summary of the classified evidence as required by the FOIA. Finally, this Report also considered prior Center analysis, which broke
down the allegations against each detainee in terms of hostile acts
8
committed against United States or its coalition partners.
Complicating this effort was the failure of the Department of Defense to specify the release of detainees by ISN. The Center navigated this omission by reviewing the weight records of detainees. The
Detention Hospital Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, Standard Operating
Procedures (“Standard Operating Procedures”) for the hospital at
9
Guantánamo require that detainees be weighed once every month.
10
Each weighing for a given individual was recorded by ISN. When
weight data for a particular detainee stopped, the Center assumed
that the detainee was released.
Yet, the weight data, which includes the ISN of the detainees,
does not include the detainees’ nationalities. Therefore, the Center
cross-referenced the ISN with data released separately by the Department of Defense to determine the nationality of a given detainee.
Together, this information yielded a picture of those being released
and when they were released. Trends pertaining to the individuals’
nationalities emerged showing that certain detainees were more likely
than others to be released to particular countries. The Center also
analyzed reports published by the Department of Defense concerning
the times, dates, and descriptions of disciplinary violations. This additional information helped correlate the ISN and nationality information with the weight data.

8

See DENBEAUX ET AL., supra note 2. Though 516 detainees’ R1 records were reviewed initially, another forty-two records were produced by the Department of Defense subsequent to the Center’s initial report. As a result, the original numbers
from the first report have changed slightly.
9
See DETENTION HOSP. GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., SOP NO. 014:
DETAINEE WEIGHT MANAGEMENT AND NUTRITION PROGRAM 52 (2003) [hereinafter SOP
No.
014],
available
at
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/GITMO_MedicalSO
Ps.pdf.
10
For an index of the detainees’ measurements see Other Detainee Related Documents,
U.S.
DEP’T
DEF.,
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/
operation_and_plans/Detainee/OtherDetaineeRelatedDocuments.html (last visited
Sept. 27, 2011).
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Following a thorough review of the weight data, the Center considered additional information obtained by reviewing press releases
by the Department of Defense. These announcements, which are
freely available to the public on the Department of Defense website,
contain information regarding the number of people released to
each country, and in many cases, the basis for the release or transfer
11
(i.e., CSRT, ARB, R1, etc.). This information was useful in a couple
of ways.
First, Department of Defense announcements for 2005 and 2006
helped confirm release dates of many detainees, which were previously inferred from the last available weight data. The number of detainees released or transferred to a particular country, as announced by
the Department of Defense, could then be compared with the weight
data estimates of releases.
Second, the Department of Defense announcements helped
supplement gaps in otherwise available information. Weight data for
a period beyond early 2007 was not available, and even the data for
late 2006 was not a wholly reliable indicator of release dates. As mentioned above, the Standard Operating Procedures mandate that de12
tainees be weighed at least once every month. Yet, the data showed
gaps in the weight measurements for some detainees that greatly exceeded this thirty-day period. The number of detainees released to
specific countries in 2007 and early 2008 thus provided a more complete picture of how nationality was related to the release or transfer
of individuals held at Guantánamo.
The weight data was also compared to variables that included
the number of paragraphs in the charges against specific detainees in
their R1 documents, the alleged association and the nexus of each
detainee, and whether the detainee was charged with a hostile or
non-hostile act. This comparison led to the finding that a detainee’s
13
alleged status as a “fighter for,” “member of,” or “associated with”
either the Taliban or al Qaeda had little correlation with the likelihood that the detainee would be transferred or released.

11
See, e.g., Press Release, Dept’t of Def., Detainee Transfer Announced (Oct. 12,
2006), available at http://www.defense.gov/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaseID=10068;
Press Release, Dept’t of Def., Detainee Transfer Announced (Oct. 16, 2006), available
at http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=10081; Press Release,
Dept’t of Def., Detainee Transfer Announced (June 19, 2007), available at
http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=11030.
12
See SOP No. 014, supra note 9.
13
See DENBEAUX ET AL., supra note 2, at 2.
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After comparing the alleged association and nexus of the detainees in R1 documents to their corresponding release dates, the Center juxtaposed this information against variables indicating the alleged level of danger of detainees used in a Pentagon-commissioned
14
West Point study. This study evaluated the danger level of each detainee based on a review of the unclassified CSRT hearing summa15
ries. A comparison of the data made evident that there was no correlation between a given detainee’s dangerousness and the likelihood
that the detainee would be released or transferred to another nation.
The Center’s analysis reveals that the continued detention of
some detainees in Guantánamo and the release of other detainees
were decided without regard to the purported evidence and without
regard to the factors identified in the Pentagon-commissioned West
Point report. Instead, the constant factor was nationality. The fact
that decisions correlate only with nationality suggests that they were
based on political considerations, rather than on individual assessments of the evidence against each detainee.
III. METHODOLOGY OF REPORT
To estimate the release dates of detainees, the Center employed
a model that combined information from the Department of Defense
weight data, the Department of Defense press releases listing detai16
nee releases and transfers, and CSRT and ARB information. Specifically, the date of a detainee’s final weighing (“MaxDate”), along with
the CSRT dates and ARB data, provided the information necessary to
determine an initial approximate date of release. This initial date,
along with a detainee’s nationality, was compared to the information
published in the Department of Defense press releases to match ISN
information to the probable date of release. Since the Department of
Defense did not usually provide information about the nationality of
released detainees, the nation to which individuals were sent was used
in lieu of nationality and then compared to the known nation of origin of the detainees. Because the data revealed that, on average, fiftyone days passed from the date of a detainee’s last weighing to the
14

JOSEPH FELTER & JARRET BRACHMAN, COMBATING TERRORISM CTR., WEST POINT,
AN ASSESSMENT OF 516 COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW TRIBUNAL (CSRT) UNCLASSIFIED
SUMMARIES
(2007),
available
at
http://www.pegc.us/archive/Organizations/CTC_csrt_rpt_20070725.pdf.
15
See id. at 2.
16
For the purposes of analysis, this Report accepts all government statements as
true and complete, and assumes that R1s accurately represent summaries of the classified evidence against the detainees. The “Weight Data Identifier” from the database is on file with the Center.

DENBEAUX & DENBEAUX_THEN AND NOW_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1292

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

11/16/2011 2:36 PM

[Vol. 41:1287

date of the detainee’s release, a release date of fifty-one days after the
final weighing was used for those detainees who were not matched to
a press release.
IV. RELEASE OF DETAINEES FROM THE GUANTÁNAMO BAY DETENTION
FACILITY: BY THE NUMBERS
A. Summary
Documents released by the Department of Defense showed that
the detention facility at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, had held a total of
17
773 prisoners since early 2002.
The prisoners’ nationalities
18
represented forty-four countries. However, 75% of the detainees
were from one of the following six countries: Afghanistan, Algeria,
China, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. Besides these six nations,
no other country had accounted for more than 2% of the total detainee population. Prior to the end of 2006, 45% (354 individuals) of
all detainees were released from Guantánamo. In addition, 201 de19
tainees did not undergo CSRT reviews. While the government did
not provided meaningful information regarding these 201 detainees,
all were released from Guantánamo Bay by November 2006. In addition, there were fourteen subsequent arrivals to Guantánamo Bay
from CIA “black sites” for whom the Center does not have R1 sum20
maries.
For each of the remaining 578 detainees who underwent the
CSRT process, substantial information is available regarding their alleged association with terrorist organizations, the alleged hostile acts
21
they undertook, their weight data, and releases. The available data
suggests that there is little correlation between the release dates for
17

LIST OF DETAINED INDIVIDUALS, supra note 6. The number is based on information as of May 2008.
18
See id.
19
See supra notes 4–6 and accompanying text. The number is based on information as of July 2008.
20
Michael Melia, U.S. Military Rehearses Terror Hearings, WASH. POST(Dec. 17,
2006,
7:43
PM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/12/17/AR2006121700462.html.
21
The Department of Defense produced the same R1 for two different detainees.
Thus, the Department of Defense produced R1s for 557 of the 558 detainees who
had CSRTs. The detainee whose R1 is missing is ISN 271, a Saudi national named
Ibrahim Muhammed Ibrahim Al Nasir who was likely released on May 18, 2006. For
public information on his release see Fourteen Guantanamo Detainees Returned to the
Kingdom,
SAUDI
EMBASSY
(June
25,
2006),
http://
www.saudiembassy.net/archive/2006/news/page453.aspx (using the transliteration
Ibraheem Mohammed Ibraheem Al-Nasser).
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detainees and their alleged commission of hostile acts or association
with al Qaeda or the Taliban.
Of the 577 detainees for whom there were available profiles,
those who were determined to have a relationship with a terrorist
group were placed in one of the following classifications: “al Qaeda,”
“Taliban,” “al Qaeda & Taliban,” “al Qaeda or Taliban,” “none al22
leged,” and “unidentified.” The nexus, or the type of relationship
the detainees were alleged to have with these organizations, was further categorized as “associated with,” “fighter for,” “member of,” and
23
“none alleged.”
Of the released detainees, documents verify that 31 were released for further detainment abroad, 104 were released to foreign
governments, 95 were released to freedom, and 3 were released for
further prosecution.
In the case in which detainees were released to foreign governments, there was no specification as to their status following transfer.
Thus, their fate and whereabouts presumably remain unknown to the
U.S. government.
B. Association and Nexus
The CSRTs concluded that a total of 184 detainees were “associated with” al Qaeda. Of these detainees, forty-three, or 12% of the
detainees released from Guantánamo, were “associated with” al Qaeda (27.6% of all who participated in CSRTs). The majority of al
Qaeda “associates” released from Guantánamo (twenty-five detainees)
were transferred to the control of a foreign government. This means
that the United States has relinquished control over these detainees
and has left a foreign entity to determine their fate.
Of the 131 detainees allegedly “associated with” the Taliban,
39% (fifty-one detainees) were released. Among the released Taliban
“associates,” 22% were released to freedom, while 59% were transferred to the control of foreign governments. A total of 148 detainees were found to be “associated with” both al Qaeda and the Taliban, 22% of whom have been released from Guantánamo. Finally, of
the thirty-nine detainees classified as “associated with” al Qaeda or
the Taliban, 15% were released from Guantánamo.
Thus, detainees who were found to have a relationship with al
Qaeda and/or the Taliban, but for whom the CSRTs did not determine conclusively with which group they were associated, were re22
23

See DENBEAUX & ET AL., supra note 2, at 8.
Id. at 9.
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leased at a substantially greater rate than those who were conclusively
found to be associated with al Qaeda.
Nearly 25% of the 321 detainees associated with one of these
terrorist groups were released to freedom, while 52% were transferred to foreign governments. The government classified forty-nine
detainees as having fought for the terrorists. Of these forty-nine detainees, either two or three were transferred to a foreign government
for further detainment, while ten or eleven were transferred to foreign governments without specified conditions for their treatment,
and two were released to freedom.
With respect to the detainees labeled as “members” of a terrorist
organization, forty-five detainees (28.8% of all detainees released
from Guantánamo who participated in a CSRT) were found to be
“members of” al Qaeda, the Taliban or both, 20% were released to
freedom, and 69% were transferred to a foreign government.
There are ten detainees who were found to have a relationship
with a terrorist group, but “no nexus” alleged. Of these ten detainees, nine were from Afghanistan. Finally, of the seventeen “fighters”
released from Guantánamo, only one was released for prosecution.
1. Little Correlation Between Nexus to Terrorist Activity
and Date of Release
Detainment periods show minimal correlation between release
date and alleged terrorist activities. The median release dates of
those detainees who were alleged fighters, associates, or members of
a terrorist group varied by a single calendar day. Surprisingly, 50% of
the detainees for whom there was no allegation of nexus or association were never released. Thus, they received treatment no different
than the detainee who were found to be members of the Taliban or
al Qaeda. The mean release dates show greater variation. The seventeen alleged fighters were released, on average, forty-three days earlier than the detainees who were merely associated with a terrorist
organization and fifty-seven days earlier than those who were only
members. These numbers contradict the common perception that a
fighter poses a greater danger in the war on terror than does an asso24
ciate or a member.
24
The Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point agrees with the assessment that fighters represent the most dangerous class of detainees. The CTC study
requested by the Department of Defense found that “[e]vidence of performing the
role of a fighter was—as expected—the most statistically and substantively significant
predictor of . . . hostilities against the United States or Coalition Allies.” FELTER &
BRACHMAN, supra note 14, at 34. The study also found that “[e]vidence of being a
fighter boosts the chances of . . . commitment to jihad by 16%.” Id. at 35.
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Even as fighters were released at a greater rate than members or
those simply associated with terrorist organizations, this increased
rate of release had little demographic impact on the population held
at Guantánamo. The proportion of alleged fighters dropped from
9% of all the detainees held at Guantánamo to 8% of those remaining when this Report was written in July 2008. Likewise, the percentage of members and associates did not change by more than a single
percent. Based on this data, a detainee’s nexus to a terrorist organization does not appear to have been a serious consideration in the
decision to release the detainee or continue his detention.
2. Little Correlation Between Association with al Qaeda
and/or the Taliban and Date of Release
There is surprisingly little correlation between association with a
terrorist group and a detainee’s release date from Guantánamo. On
average, persons associated with al Qaeda were detained approximately two months longer than those associated with the Taliban.
Persons associated with both al Qaeda and the Taliban were detained
for almost identical periods of time as those who were only associated
with al Qaeda. The persons detained the longest at Guantánamo
were the thirty-nine detainees alleged to be associated with either al
Qaeda or the Taliban. The government data suggests that it was uncertain with which group each detainee from that class was associated, but once a detainee’s association was determined, the detainee’s release followed shortly thereafter. For each of these groups,
the median date of release lies on either November 19, 2006 or November 24, 2006. In other words, of those associated with any terrorist organization, 50% were never released. Viewing the data as demographic compositions of the yearly population at Guantánamo
provides a different perspective on the picture that there was little or
no distinction between the groups. The data shows that detainees
were not treated according to the varying degrees of seriousness of
their conduct or the different levels of potential danger, which depends on the terrorist organization with which the detainees were allegedly associated.
C. Allegations of Hostile Acts Have Inverse Impact on Date of
Release
Of the 557 detainees who participated in CSRTs, 47% were accused of committing hostile acts. On average, those accused of hostile acts were released slightly later than those not accused of committing any hostile acts. This conclusion is supported by the fifty-nine-
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day difference in the mean MaxDate, and a sixteen-day difference in
the mean release date. The larger difference in the mean MaxDate is
due to the fact that, proportionally, more of the detainees who were
not alleged to have committed hostile acts were released. This issue
is addressed later in the Report.
As part of the CSRT process, detainees received summaries of
25
the classified evidence, R1s, against them. Each of these documents
included two paragraphs of allegations which supported the detainees’ alleged association with and nexus to al Qaeda, the Taliban, or
26
both, and any allegations of committed hostile acts. Paragraph 3a
27
noted the detainees’ association with a terrorist organization. The
detainees received between zero and twenty-three counts supporting
the claims of association. Any alleged hostile acts were noted sepa28
rately, in Paragraph 3b of the R1s.
At first, there appears to be a correlation between the number of
3a allegations made and the date of release; the detainees with fewer
allegations were released earlier. Yet, this correlation is not significant because the number of allegations is normally distributed
around 5.5. Those detainees receiving fourteen, fifteen, sixteen,
twenty-three, and zero allegations constitute outliers, and are therefore not statistically significant. When these points are omitted, the
apparent correlation falls apart. In fact, it appears that any correlation that does exist is inverse—the detainees with the most charges
against them, presumably the most dangerous or, at least, the most
likely to have been guilty, were released the earliest. The most common number of Paragraph 3a allegations was four; a total of 17% of
the 557 detainees who underwent the CSRT process received four allegations. However, there were thirty-five detainees who received ten
to thirteen allegations in their Paragraph 3a. Those detainees with
the high number of counts were, on average, released before those
who received only four counts. It appears that, in many instances,
where more evidence existed to confirm the detainee’s alleged association and nexus, the release rate was higher and occurred more
quickly. Based on this finding, it appears that the government’s evidentiary support for its allegations of a detainee’s connection to a

25
See, e.g., Unclassified Summary of Basis for Tribunal Decision, Hicks v. United
States,
No.
02-CV-0299
(D.D.C.
Oct.
1,
2004),
available
at
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_1-91.pdf.
26
See e.g., id. at 1–2.
27
See e.g., id. at 1.
28
See e.g., id. at 1–2.
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terrorist organization was not a serious or consistent consideration
when determining whether to release or continue to detain the detainee.
The Paragraph 3b data presents a similar scenario. Initially, it
may appear that detainees were detained longer than others when
their R1s listed more allegations that supported claims of hostile acts,
but this apparent correlation does not survive closer inspection. Of
the 557 detainees for whom R1s are available, 295 were not alleged to
have committed any hostile acts. For those who were alleged to have
committed hostile acts, the number of allegations is normally distributed around 2.8. The categories farthest from the mean number of
allegations, which represent a very small proportion of the population, are not significant. When those categories are removed from
consideration—namely, those with six or more Paragraph 3b allegations—the apparent correlation between fewer allegations and earlier
release vanishes, and may in fact be reverse.
The reversal of the correlation is clear in that those detainees
with two to five allegations of hostile activity were, on average, released between one and three months earlier than those who had only one allegation of hostile activity. Likewise, those with four and five
allegations were released, on average, more than two months earlier
than those with only one, two, or three allegations against them.
These findings make clear that the government’s own evidentiary
support for its allegations of detainees’ hostile acts had not been a
factor seriously or consistently considered in the decision to release
or continue detention of such detainees.
D. CTC Factors Not Consistently Applied
According to West Point’s Combating Terror Center (CTC), detainees can be further categorized by a series of factors which meas29
ure the risk the detainees pose in the war on terror. The twelve factors are divided into three categories, with four factors in each: 1)
“Level 3,” (“Low Risk”), representing characteristics that demonstrate
that a detainee is acquainted with dangerous persons; 2) “Level 2,”
(“Medium Risk”), suggesting that the detainee poses a probable risk;
and 3) “Level 1,” (“High Risk”), representing characteristics that the

29

FELTER & BRACHMAN, supra note 14, at 4. While the CTC factors are not an officially recognized evidentiary basis for detention, they were a system for analyzing
the officially recognized R1s and were created at the behest of the Department of
Defense. See id. at 2. If the R1s contain information that is used in the decision to
release or to continue detention, correlation between the CTC factors and the date
of release is to be expected.
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detainee poses a demonstrated risk. The CTC categorized 516 de31
tainees based on the number of factors present at each risk level. As
with the government’s evidentiary factors, there appears to be a slight
correlation between the CTC factors attributed to a detainee and the
detainee’s ultimate release date. The significance of this correlation,
however, is very low.
As with the number of Paragraph 3a and 3b allegations, there
appears to be an inverse correlation with the release dates. Of the
detainees who maintained two of the four risk factors, 123 detainees
32
were placed in the High Risk group, 188 were placed in the Medium
34
33
Risk group, and 120 were placed in the Low Risk group. The mean
release date for detainees with two risk factors was nearly identical at
the Medium Risk and High Risk levels. These detainees were released on average thirty-six days earlier than those with two risk factors in the Low Risk category. Detainees with only two out of four
risk factors at the Medium Risk and High Risk levels were also released on average before persons with three and four risk factors at
the Low Risk level.
The release data for the detainees having three of the four risk
factors mirrors the above finding. Detainees with three risk factors at
the High Risk and Medium Risk levels were released approximately
three weeks prior to those having three factors of Low Risk. In other
words, the lower risk detainees were released on the same date and
later than those to whom more factors applied. Among the detainees
who had the greatest number of risk factors according to the CTC
report, the more dangerous were released first. If the Medium Risk
and High Risk levels represent the likelihood that a detainee poses a
threat, one would think that these detainees would also satisfy categories in the Low Risk status, since the latter merely represents that a
35
detainee knows dangerous persons. On the contrary, there appears
to be little correlation between the CTC risk factors and a detainee’s
date of release. Yet, there is a correlation demonstrating that the
more factors a detainee had and the greater danger a detainee
represented, the sooner and the more likely it was that he be released
from Guantánamo.
30
31
32
33
34
35

See id. at 4–6, 10.
See id.
Id. at 31.
Id.
Id. at 32.
FELTER & BRACHMAN, supra note 14, at 10.
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IV. PATTERN OF RELEASE EXPLAINED BY NATIONALITY
While the data demonstrates little or no correlation between the
severity of the accusations against the detainees and their release
date, one characteristic has shown significant correlation to the release dates: country of origin. Before explaining the significance of
this correlation, however, it is important to define “release.” While
the definition might seem clear, the Department of Defense’s data
constructs a rather mottled interpretation. Of the detainees released
up to November 2006, only 27% were officially released to freedom.
Twenty-nine percent of the released detainees were released to foreign governments. Further 9% were released for detention abroad
and 1% were released for prosecution. Strikingly, 34% had no do36
cumented release category.
A. Nations with High Numbers of Released Detainees
1.

Afghanistan

The data demonstrates what might be reasonably expected—
37
the country with the largest number of detainees is Afghanistan.
Surprisingly, however, nearly 70% of those detained from Afghanistan were released by November 2006. As indicated by the mean release date of March 30, 2005, the release of Afghan detainees was
steady from the beginning of 2003. Of the released Afghan detainees, fifty-seven participated in CSRTs, 32% were alleged to have
committed hostile acts and 65% were alleged to be connected to al
Qaeda, the Taliban, or both. Only 1% of the released Afghan detainees were sent to Afghanistan for continued detention. A significant
percentage (42%) were not released for continued detention but to
freedom.
3. Pakistan
Of the six countries representing more than 2% of the population in Guantánamo, the nation with the greatest number of released
38
detainees is Pakistan, with sixty-one of sixty-six detainees released.
However, over 67% of the Pakistanis released who participated in
CSRTs were alleged to have committed hostile acts. Furthermore,
over 40% of all those released were sent back to Pakistan for continued detention. As we have seen, in contrast, only 1% of Afghan de36
Charts and descriptions reviewing the breakdown of releases from the nations
with the most detainees in Guantánamo are on file with the Center.
37
See LIST OF DETAINED INDIVIDUALS, supra note 6.
38
See id.
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tainees who were released were sent to Afghanistan for continued detention. The majority of Pakistani detainees were released relatively
quickly, with a mean release date of July 2004.
4. Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia was unique among the top six countries in that it is
the only one with a high release rate that has not seen 50% of its detainee population released as of November 2006. In 2007, sixty-three
additional detainees were released to Saudi Arabia. Assuming that a
majority of the released were Saudi nationals, more than half of the
Saudi detainees had been released as of the end of 2007. The data
set depicted in this Report, however, takes into consideration the data as of November 2006.
B. Nations with Low Numbers of Released Detainees
The Department of Defense data reveals that the detainees from
certain nations’ are less likely to be released from Guantánamo than
the detainees of other nations. This is most clearly supported by the
release rates of Yemeni and Algerian detainees.
1. Yemen
39

A total of eight out of 108 Yemeni detainees were released.
Compare this to a release rate of 94% for the Pakistani detainees.
Additionally, only two of the 108 Yemeni detainees were released to
40
freedom. Thus, only 1.8% of Yemeni detainees attained freedom,
compared to 42% of Afghan detainees. The reason for the disparate
treatment is not clear because there is no significant difference in the
accusations against the two groups. One theory is that the higher
percentage of hostile acts alleged against Yemeni detainees—62%
compared to a total detainee population average of 47%—caused
their continued detention. This is disproved, however, by the counterexample of Algeria, with an average of hostile acts alleged in only
36% of the cases.
2. Algeria
Like the Yemeni detainees, only 4% of Algerian detainees were
released. Despite the fact that Algerian detainees had the lowest per39

As of July 2008, the Center identified these detainees as Walid Mohhamed
Shahir, Karam Khamis Sayd Khamsan, Ali Abdullah Ahmed, Ali Husayn Abdullah AlTays, Issam Amid Al Bin Ali Al Jafi, Mahsin Mohammad Masheen Mobil, Mohammed
Ahmed Ali Al Asadi, and Saleh Mohamed Al Zuba.
40
Id.
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centage of alleged hostile acts among the groups at Guantánamo, an
Algerian detainee was twenty-four times less likely to be released than
a Pakistani detainee. In addition, unlike detainees from countries
such as Saudi Arabia, Algerian detainees’ conditions for release were
not documented.
3. China
The Chinese detainees represent a special case. All detainees
of Chinese nationality were ethnic Uighurs, an Islamic minority from
41
western China. The Department of Defense has admitted that the
Uighurs are not, and never were, a threat to the United States or the
42
coalition forces in Afghanistan. Yet, they could not return to Chi43
44
na. Thus, five of the twenty-two Uighurs were released to Albania.
However, as of the time when this Report was compiled in July 2008,
45
the other sixteen Uighurs remained detained at Guantánamo, despite the lack of any basis for detention. Indeed, while 45% of all detainees had been released, 73% of the Uighurs remained confined.
Comparing release rates of these nations strongly indicates that
many detainees are being released on the basis of nationality alone.
Conversely, many detainees for whom little or no evidence exists were
still being held after five years of detention. This disparity of treatment is evident in the demographic makeup of the Guantánamo
population when viewed on an annual basis.
C. Nationality Groups Confirm that Political Distinctions Drive the
Release Decisions
Of the 381 detainees from nations where Arabic is an official
language, only eighty-nine detainees (23.4%) were released as of the
end of 2006. This is significantly lower than the 45.8% of all combined detainees who were released during the same period. The late
release dates are also in stark contrast to the release dates of detainees from the other major nationality groups. Of the thirty-three detainees from post-Soviet nations, fifteen (45.5%) were released by of
41

Ishaan Tharoor, A Brief History of the Uighurs, TIME.COM (July 9, 2009),
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1909416,00.html.
42
After Detention, Where Can the Uighurs Go?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2009),
http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/31/after-detention-where-canthe-uighurs-go.
43
Id.
44
Detainee Transfer Announced, U.S. DEP’T DEF. May 05, 2006, available at
http://www.defense.gov/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaseID=9527.
45
As of 2011, there are only five remaining Uighurs detained at Guantánamo.
Editorial, Every Zone, WASH. POST, May 24, 2011, at A20 .
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the beginning of 2007. In fact, all but one of these detainees was released prior to the CSRT process. Meanwhile, from the twenty-four
detainees who were citizens of traditional United States’ allies, all but
three were released as of 2007. Comparing the mean release dates of
these three groups cements the picture: on average, citizens of traditional United States’ allies were released one year earlier than citizens
of post-Soviet nations, who were, in turn, released, ten months prior
to Arab nationals.
The post-Soviet group itself represents a microcosm of the entire
population. Of the thirty-three detainees in this group, only the Russians and the Tajiks were released in large proportions. While 70%
of the Russians and Tajiks were released, only one of the eight Uzbeks was released, and none of the Azerbaijanis, Kazakhs, or Turkmens were released. Once again, stark differences in treatment between nationalities can be seen, which far outweigh the differences in
treatment based on individualized evidentiary factors.
D. The Special Case of Afghanistan
The data indicates that detainees from Afghanistan were released the fastest and the most frequently of all the detainees held in
Guantánamo. Well over two-thirds of all detainees from Afghanistan
were transferred or released by late 2006. Of this number, over 42%
were released to freedom. The proportion of Afghans released to
freedom or transferred, compared to detainees from all other nations, shows that an Afghan national had the best chance of being released. This discovery is interesting in light of the “Fact Sheet” dated
46
June 13, 2008 published by the Department of Defense. This publication claimed that the former detainees “known or suspected of returning to terrorist activities” transferred to Afghanistan and Pakistan
47
have generally reengaged in local, anti-coalition activity. Of the ten
people listed in this release, six are from Afghanistan. Despite this
claimed recidivism on the part of Afghans formerly detained at Guantánamo, Afghans represent the greatest number of those released to
freedom.

46
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., FACT SHEET: FORMER GTMO DETAINEE TERRORISM TRENDS
(2008),
available
at
http://www.defense.gov/news/d20080613Returntothefightfactsheet.pdf.
47
See id.
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E. Nationality, Not Alleged Level of Danger, Determines Chance of
Release

Although there may be other explanations, the Department of
Defense has yet to offer them. Absent such an explanation, the conclusion seems inescapable—the detainees’ country of origin, not
their alleged degree of danger, was what determined their chance of
release.
V. ANY CORRELATION BETWEEN RELEASE DATE AND GOVERNMENT
EVIDENCE IS A RESULT OF THE GOVERNMENT’S DECISION TO RELEASE
BASED UPON NATIONALITY
The slight correlations between release date, nexus, association,
and hostile acts can be explained by reviewing the composition of
those factors by nationality. The mean release dates show that fighters were released slightly earlier than members or associates, while
those with no alleged nexus were released significantly earlier than
those with a nexus. However, of the ten detainees not alleged to have
any nexus, nine were Afghan. Afghans, overall, are released much
earlier than other nationalities. Because Afghans make up only 28%
of the total population, the early release of the detainees who fall in
the “none-alleged” category is a result of the fact that they were predominantly Afghan. For it to be otherwise, the Afghan population in
Guantánamo would have to be proportionate to the percentage of
detainees without any alleged nexus: 90%. In comparison, of the forty-nine detainees alleged to be fighters, more than 50% were Afghans, Pakistanis, and Saudis, and were released much earlier than the
“fighters” who belonged to the other top six nationalities. Meanwhile, only 16% of the “fighter” category, 24% of the “associated
with” category, and 26% of the “member” category were Yemeni and
Algerian nationals.
While Yemeni and Algerian nationals represented 133 detainees
in Guantánamo, only nine were released. This implies that the slight
correlation between nexus and release date is likely a product of random sampling within nationalities, rather than a secondary criterion
of release. In addition, the slight correlation between association and
release date is similarly a product of nationality. As with nexus , 90%
of the ten detainees not alleged to be associated with any organization are Afghan. Thus, their earlier release is not a product of a lack
of association, but rather the product of their nationality.
The slightly earlier release of those associated with the Taliban,
relative to those associated with al Qaeda, al Qaeda and the Taliban,
and al Qaeda or the Taliban, can also be explained by national com-
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position. Yemeni and Algerian nationals combined represent only
17% of the Taliban category, while together they represent 31%,
25%, and 35% of the al Qaeda, the al Qaeda and the Taliban, and
the al Qaeda or the Taliban categories, respectively. Meanwhile, 38%
of the Taliban category consists of Afghan nationals, compared to
3%, 20%, and 15% of Afghans in the other categories. Thus, the relatively early release of the Taliban is likely a product of the distinct
treatment of Afghans as compared to Yemenis and Algerians.
In fact, the slight correlation between association and release
date would likely be much stronger if it were not for the contribution
of the Saudis. The Taliban category consists of 22% Saudis, the al
Qaeda consists of 30%, the al Qaeda and the Taliban consist of 27%,
and the al Qaeda or the Taliban consists of only 13%. Though Saudis are released earlier than Yemenis and Algerians, they still have a
median MaxDate of November 19, 2006. This date, later than the
date for Afghans, mitigates the average release dates.
The fifty-nine-day difference in mean MaxDate between those
who were and those were not alleged to have committed hostile acts
is also likely a product of nationality. The proportion of Yemeni in
each category is most salient here: Yemenis made up 25% of the detainees alleged to have committed hostile acts, but only 14% of those
who were not alleged to have committed any hostile acts. Conversely,
Afghans made up 24.5% of those who were not alleged to have committed hostile acts, and only 20% of those who were. Saudis again
played a mitigating role, contributing 26% of the detainees alleged to
have committed a hostile act, and 21.5% of those who were not.
Because the correlation between the average release date and
each of these factors is explainable as a product of the nationalities in
each category, these correlations are not causal in nature. Therefore,
this leaves nationality as the only known causal factor that determines
the date of release.
VI. CONCLUSION—EVIDENCE AGAINST DETAINEES WAS NOT USED
TO JUSTIFY CONTINUED DETENTION
A review of the Department of Defense’s own data reveals that
there was not a consistent practice of releasing detainees based on
their alleged association with al Qaeda and/or the Taliban. In addition, the number of charges against any given detainee did not seem
to affect the detainee’s release date. Instead, the only constant factor
that had correlation to detainees’ earlier release was the nationality
of those released. A finding that nationality had the only causal relation to release date shows that either the Department of Defense
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never believed their own allegations for the basis of detention, or that
they knowingly released individuals they believed to be dangerous.

